In this paper we jointly evaluate the Federal Reserve staff forecasts of U.S. real output growth and the inflation rate assuming the forecasts are to be used as inputs for the Taylor rule. Our simple methodology generates "policy forecast errors" which have a direct interpretation for the impact of forecast errors on the target interest rate given by the Taylor rule. Without interest rate smoothing, we find that, on average, the Taylor rule target interest rate would have been approximately a full percentage point away from the intended target because of errors in forecasting output growth and inflation. Our results are robust to changes in the forecast horizon and to changes in the weights on the variables in the policy rule.
Introduction
Forecasts are an essential input into all decisions involving the future. The accuracy of these forecasts can determine the adequacy, validity, and credibility of both macro and micro economic decisions. It is for this reason that the accuracy of these forecasts is evaluated.
However, there are different perspectives or approaches for conducting these evaluations. In one approach, the forecaster's accuracy is evaluated while another method considers the value of the forecast to its users.
The traditional approach for evaluating accuracy has been to measure the magnitude of the error that is associated with the forecasts of each particular variable.
1 If an individual or organization forecasts both the inflation rate and the GDP growth rate for next year, the accuracy of the forecast of each variable is calculated separately. This is the approach that has been previously used to evaluate the forecasts of the Federal Reserve's staff (Clements et al., 2007; Joutz and Stekler, 2000; Romer and Romer, 2000; Sims, 2002; Stekler, 1994) .
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There is, however, a problem that is associated with this traditional forecast evaluation approach: the loss function may contain more than one argument. This paper addresses this problem, focusing on the forecasts of the Federal Reserve (Fed). The Fed is concerned with both inflation and output growth. This suggests that the accuracy of both variables should be evaluated simultaneously. Sinclair et al. (2010) provided the procedures for jointly evaluating the directional accuracy of the Fed's forecasts but did not consider how to jointly evaluate the quantitative predictions.
1 Usually mean square error is the error metric because it is associated with a quadratic loss function. 2 While most evaluations have focused on the accuracy of a particular variable, there have also been discussions about the appropriate procedures for jointly evaluating multiple forecasts (See Hymans, 1968; Clements and Hendry and subsequent comments, 1993; Eisenbeis, et al., 2002; and Komunjer and Owyang, 2007) or for comparing forecasts of different variables (Lahiri and Sheng, 2010 Our work is in the spirit of evaluating forecasts by considering the economic costs of prediction errors (Clements, 2004; Pesaran, 2000a and 2000b; and Pesaran and Skouras, 2002) . It is also related to the work by Orphanides (2001 Orphanides ( , 2003 on the impact of realtime data on monetary policy. Our contribution is to draw these two lines of research together to specifically evaluate forecasts in the context for which they are prepared.
We next present data used in this analysis. We evaluate the Greenbook forecasts that are made by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Fed. These forecasts are produced before each meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee and contain projections on the economy up to eight quarters into the future. We then present a methodology for evaluating policy forecast errors assuming that the Fed follows the Taylor rule. Subsequent sections present the results, robustness checks with respect to the specification of the policy rule, and our conclusions.
Data
We examine the Greenbook forecasts for each quarter from 1965.4 through 2002.4, but, for some analyses, also divide the data into two subperiods, 1965.4-1979.2 and 1979.3-2002.4. 4 These periods correspond to the pre-Volcker and Volcker-Greenspan eras at the Fed. The projections used in this analysis are the annualized growth rate of real output (GNP from 1965 to 1991 and GDP from 1992 on) and the annualized inflation rate (based on the implicit price deflator through the first quarter of 1996, then the chain-weighted price index from 1996.2 on).
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We only analyze the current quarter and one quarter ahead projections.
We focus on short horizons because the Greenbook forecasts have sometimes been based on an assumed (possibly varying) path for monetary policy. At other times, however, the forecasts assumed that monetary policy would remain unchanged over its forecast horizon (Reifschneider and Tulip, 2007) . Since the assumed path for monetary policy associated with each Greenbook forecast is not known, a possible complication arises when analyzing longerterm forecasts. The current quarter and one-quarter ahead forecasts are too short of a time horizon, however, to be affected by the Fed's future path for monetary policy. Therefore, regardless of whether the Fed assumes a constant path or a varying path for monetary policy, the current and one-quarter-ahead forecasts will be unaffected by those assumptions.
There are at least two forecasts per quarter, each made in various months of the quarter.
Consequently the forecasts made for the current and next quarter have leads of zero to five months to the end of the relevant quarter. The horizons of the forecasts vary between zero and five months: horizons of (a) zero to two months and (b) three to five months for the current and next quarters, respectively. Because forecasts were not made at all horizons in every quarter, the 4 The Greenbook data are only available with at least a 5-year lag. 5 We use the compounded annual rate of change to construct the growth rates. (2007) In order to analyze the effects of the Fed's forecasts errors on its selection of a target interest rate, it is necessary to first establish the relevant policy rule. We assume the Fed either follows the original Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) or uses it as a guide in setting monetary policy.
Although Taylor originally proposed his rule as an empirical description of past Fed policy actions, Woodford (2001a Woodford ( , 2001b has shown that the Taylor rule can also be theoretically justified as a prescriptive rule. Clarida et al (2000) suggested that it should be forward-looking, employing expected future values of both output and inflation. As pointed out by Orphanides (2001), even if the Fed is using current values of both output and inflation, the data the Fed has at the time they are setting policy is not the actual values, but predictions of those values. Rather than focusing on the various issues associated with this rule, we start with the fixed weights proposed by Taylor (1993) . We show in Section 6 that our results are robust to the range of weights considered in the literature. 6 The use of the real time data avoids definitional and classification changes. Our results are robust to when the data published 45-60 days after the end of the quarter are used. 
where r* is the equilibrium real interest rate, π* is the Fed's implicit inflation rate target, and Y* is potential output. While the output gap (i.e. lnY -lnY*) is typically used in the Taylor rule, the growth rate of real GDP is typically used in forecast evaluation. For our application we replace the output gap by the GDP growth rates, yielding the following policy rule:
where y* is the potential output growth rate. 
7 Following Orphanides (2001), we assume that the Fed uses the Greenbook forecasts in their decision rule. 8 If we assume that potential output, Y*, is either known or a constant, then we can difference out potential output which permits us to use the growth rate in order to construct the policy rule. A similar approach has been used by Hamilton et al. (2009) . For a discussion of the role of real time output gap estimates and the Taylor rule, see Orphanides (2001 
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Evaluation Procedure: Standards of Comparison
There are two sets of forecasts that we use as standards of comparison: the PFEs that would have occurred if (1) naïve forecasts or (2) the median forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters 10 had been used to set policy. In each case, the comparison uses the same weights and has the same number of observations as were used in constructing the PFEs of the Fed forecasts that we are evaluating. We calculate the mean absolute policy forecast error (MAPFE) and root mean squared policy forecast error (RMSPFE) for the full sample as well as for a sub-sample where we have the median forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) available for comparison.
The naïve forecast assumes that the same growth rate of output and the same inflation rate as were observed in the previous quarter will occur in the future period(s). 11 We also use the 9 For a discussion of the impact of using projections on the estimates of the Taylor rule, see Orphanides and Wieland (2008) . We do not use the interest rate, the equilibrium real interest rate, the Fed's implicit inflation rate target, or potential output in our analysis. Considerable research has gone into estimating these variables (e.g. Clark and Kozicki, 2005 , for the equilibrium real interest rate and Leigh, 2008 , for the Fed's implicit inflation rate target). While these variables may be time-varying, we treat them here as known to the policymaker and they thus drop out of our expression. This assumption allows us to isolate the impact of forecast errors. 10 These data come from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (for a description of this survey, see Croushore, 1993) . 11 We construct these naïve "forecasts" from the real-time data, published in the Greenbook, of GDP growth and the inflation rate for the quarter before the Greenbook forecasts were made. This assures that the same information as median forecasts from the SPF to construct forecasts comparable to our Greenbook data. Since the SPF forecasts are only reported once per quarter (in the middle of the second month of each quarter), they are comparable to the Fed forecasts made with one and four month horizons. The SPF forecasts are available beginning with the fourth quarter of 1968.
Results
For the entire sample 1965:4-2002:4, the mean absolute policy forecast error (MAPFE) based on Fed forecasts at the zero month horizon is 101 basis points (Table 1 ). This can be interpreted as the amount by which the implied target interest rate based on the Taylor rule would have differed by using forecasts rather than the actual data in the policy rule. 12 According to this analysis, the implied target interest rate based on the Taylor rule was at least a full percentage point off because of errors in forecasting growth and inflation at the zero horizon.
13
We also tested for bias, but the null of no bias was usually not rejected. (2007) points out, however, we use the actual values for output and inflation in the Taylor rule, it appears that monetary policy was much looser than prescribed by the Taylor rule. 13 This result holds even if we look at the 4-quarter average of the forecasts instead of just the current quarter. The volatility of the forecast errors is reduced with the 4-quarter average, but the size of the errors increases and offsets the volatility reduction.
RMSPFE in the more recent period. The similarity of these results with the full sample results, however, suggests that our findings for the full-sample are not dependent upon a specific time period. 14 Furthermore, the improvement is also present for the naïve forecasts, which suggests no relative improvement on the part of the Fed.
Alternative Specifications
In our analysis we have chosen to focus on the policy rule as initially formulated in Taylor (1993) . Subsequently, a number of authors have estimated the policy rule that was actually used by the Fed (e.g. Clarida et al, 2000; Orphanides, 2001) . Two key issues are the size of the policy rule weights and the role of interest rate smoothing.
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6A. Alternative Policy Rule Weights
One focus of this literature, and the part relevant to our analysis, is the weights associated with inflation and output in the Taylor rule. We performed a simple calculation to examine the effect on the PFE of using weights other than those of the original Taylor Rule. The PFE is a weighted sum of the individual forecast errors, consequently we ask: Given the individual forecast errors, what weights would minimize the impact of the forecast errors on the implied target interest rate? We thus determined the weights that minimize the RMSPFE of the Fed's forecasts, assuming that the weights summed to two. 16 We calculated different weights for each horizon and allowed for both the case where the weights are constant for the full sample and allowing the weights to differ between the pre-Volcker and Volcker-Greenspan periods. In all 14 These subsamples are representative of several alternative subsamples that we explored. 15 Another concern, beyond the scope of this paper, is that the optimal Taylor rule may not be linear (Nobay and Peel, 2003) . There has been a substantial amount of research in evaluating forecasts in the case of nonlinear loss functions (e.g. Elliott et al., 2005 and Patton and Timmermann, 20071) , including evidence that the Fed's loss function may not be linear, with respect to inflation (Capistran, 2008) and with respect to output growth (Patton and Timermann, 2007b) when the forecasts are evaluated separately. 16 Almost identical results were found when we instead minimized the MAPFE. The restriction that the coefficients sum to two is consistent with the literature where every estimate or prescriptive rule we found suggests the coefficients sum to something greater than or equal to two. We chose the lower bound so that we are truly minimizing the RMSPFE.
cases the weights are very similar to the Taylor weights. These weights do not necessarily imply anything about actual Fed behavior, but they allow us to set a lower bound on the impact of forecast errors on the implied target interest rate. 17 The results are very similar to what we found using the Taylor weights. Based on this analysis we still conclude that, without smoothing, the impact of forecast errors alone on the implied target interest rate based on the Taylor rule is approximately 100 basis points.
6B. Interest Rate Smoothing
According to Giannoni and Woodford (2002) , the application of certainty equivalence requires interest rate smoothing. Therefore, suppose the policy rule is modified to allow for interest rate smoothing. The policy forecast error in this case would be a simple proportion of the policy forecast error without smoothing:
Estimates of the smoothing parameter, ρ, have varied widely in the literature (e.g. Clarida et al, 1998 , find ρ = 0.8, whereas Rudebusch, 2001 , argues that the smoothing parameter may be negligible in practice). For example, if the smoothing parameter is 0.5, then the impact of the forecast errors on the policy decision is reduced by half. Thus, the larger the forecast errors are expected to be, the greater the benefit of smoothing. 
Conclusions
In this paper we developed a simple methodology in order to evaluate the impact of forecast errors on the Fed's monetary policy as characterized by a policy rule that is assumed to take the form of a Taylor rule. We find that the Fed's policy forecast error is smaller than the 17 In particular, the specific weights found by Clarida et al (2000) were in the set of potential weights we considered. Their weights resulted in a higher MAPFE than those that minimized the MAPFE. The weights, RMSPFEs, and MAPFEs are all available from the authors upon request. 18 This assumes, however, that the past interest rate was set in an appropriate way. As noted by Orphanides and Williams (2007) , interest rate smoothing can also cause past errors to persist.
errors that would have resulted from naïve forecasts or SPF predictions. Nevertheless, the mean absolute policy forecast error of the Fed forecasts is approximately 100 basis points. The results for selected subsamples were similar to those for the entire period and a simple calculation showed that the weights placed on the two variables that minimize the PFE were similar to those contained in the original Taylor Rule. Thus we find the robust result that, without interest-rate smoothing, forecast errors contribute a mean absolute error of approximately 100 basis points to target interest rates set by using a Taylor Rule. 
